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Memory analysis is an established technique for malware analysis and is increasingly used
for incident response. However, in most incident response situations, the responder often
has no control over the precise version of the operating system that must be responded to.
It is therefore critical to ensure that memory analysis tools are able to work with a wide
range of OS kernel versions, as found in the wild. This paper characterizes the properties of
different Windows kernel versions and their relevance to memory analysis. By collecting a
large number of kernel binaries we characterize how struct offsets change with versions.
We ﬁnd that although struct layout is mostly stable across major and minor kernel ver-
sions, kernel global offsets vary greatly with version. We develop a “proﬁle indexing”
technique to rapidly detect the exact kernel version present in a memory image. We can
therefore directly use known kernel global offsets and do not need to guess those by
scanning techniques. We demonstrate that struct offsets can be rapidly deduced from
analysis of kernel pool allocations, as well as by automatic disassembly of binary functions.
As an example of an undocumented kernel driver, we use the win32k.sys GUI subsystem
driver and develop a robust technique for combining both proﬁle constants and reversed
struct offsets into accurate proﬁles, detected using a proﬁle index.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Memory analysis has become a powerful technique for
the detection and identiﬁcation of malware, and for digital
forensic investigations (Ligh et al., 2010, 2014).
Fundamentally, memory analysis is concerned with
interpreting the seemingly unstructured raw memory data
which can be collected from a live system into meaningful
and actionable information. At ﬁrst sight, the memory
content of a live system might appear to be composed of
nothing more than random bytes. However, those bytes are
arranged in a predetermined order by the running software
to represent a meaningful data structure. For example
consider the C struct:ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWSThe compiler will decide how to overlay the struct ﬁelds
in memory depending on their size, alignment re-
quirements and other consideration. So for example, the
CreateTime ﬁeld might get 8 bytes, causing the Image-
FileName ﬁeld to begin 8 bytes after the start of the
_EPROCESS struct.
A memory analysis framework must have the same
layout information in order to know where each ﬁeld
should be found in relation to the start of the struct. Early
memory analysis systems hard coded this layout informa-
tion which was derived by other means (e.g. reverse. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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header ﬁle (Schuster, 2007)).
This approach is not scalable though, since the struct
deﬁnition change routinely between versions of the oper-
ating system. For example, in the above simpliﬁed struct of
an _EPROCESS, if additional ﬁelds are inserted, the layout of
the ﬁeld members will change to make room for the new
elements. So for example, if another 4 byte ﬁeld is added
before the CreateTime ﬁeld, all other offsets will have to
increase by 4 bytes to accommodate the new ﬁeld. This will
cause all the old layout information to be incorrect and our
interpretation of the struct in memory to be wrong.
Modern memory analysis frameworks address the var-
iations across different operating system versions by use of
a version speciﬁc memory layout template mechanism. For
example in Volatility (The Volatility Foundation, 2014) or
Rekall (The Rekall Team, 2014a, b) this information is called
a proﬁle.
The Volatility memory analysis framework (The
Volatility Foundation, 2014) is shipped with a number of
Windows proﬁles embedded into the program. The user
chooses the correct proﬁle to use depending on their
image. For example, if analyzing a Windows 7 image, the
proﬁle might be speciﬁed as Win7SP1x64. In Volatility, the
proﬁle name conveys major version information (i.e. Win-
dows 7), minor version information (i.e. Service Pack 1) and
architecture (i.e. 64). Volatility uses this information to
select a proﬁle from the set of built-in proﬁles.Deriving proﬁle information
The problem still remains how to derive this struct
layout information automatically. The Windows kernel
contains many struct deﬁnitions, and these change for each
version, so a brute force solution is not scalable (Okolica
and Peterson, 2010).
Memory analysis frameworks are not the only case
where information about memory layout is required. Spe-
ciﬁcally, when debugging an application, the debugger
needs to know how to interpret the memory of the
debugged program in order to correctly display it to the
user. Since the compiler is the one originally deciding on
the memory layout, it makes sense that the compiler gen-
erates debugging information about memory layout for the
debugger to use.
On Windows systems, the most common compiler used
is the Microsoft Visual Studio compiler (MSVCC). This
compiler shares debugging information via a PDB ﬁle
(Schreiber, 2001), generated during the build process for
the executable. The PDB ﬁle format is unfortunately un-
documented, but has been reverse engineered sufﬁciently
to be able to extract accurate debugging information, such
as struct memory layout, reliably (Schreiber, 2001; Dolan-
Gavitt, 2007a).
The PDB ﬁle for an executable is normally not shipped
together with the executable. The executable contains a
unique GUID referring to the PDB ﬁle that describes this
executable. When the debugger wishes to debug a partic-
ular executable, it can then request the correct PDB ﬁle
from a symbol server. This design allows productionbinaries to be debugged, without needing to ship bulky
debug information with ﬁnal release binaries.
The PDB ﬁle contains a number of useful pieces of in-
formation for a memory analysis framework:
 Struct members and memory layout. This contains in-
formation about memory offsets for struct members,
and their types. This is useful in order to interpret the
contents of memory.
 Global constants. The Windows kernel contains many
important constants, which are required for analysis. For
example, the PsActiveProcessHead is a constant pointer
to the beginning of the process linked list, and is
required in order to list processes by walking that list.
 Function addresses. The location of functions inmemory
is also provided in the PDB ﬁle e even if these functions
are not exported. This is important in order to resolve
addresses back to functions (e.g. in viewing the Inter-
rupt Descriptor Table e IDT).
 Enumeration. In C an enumeration is a compact way to
represent one of a set of choices using an integer. The
mapping between the integer value and a human
meaningful string is stored in the PDB ﬁle, and it is
useful for interpreting meaning from memory.Characterizing kernel version variability
As described previously, the Volatility tool only contains
a handful of proﬁles generated for different major releases
of the Windows kernel. However, each time the kernel is
rebuilt by Microsoft (e.g. for a security hot ﬁx), the code
could be changed, and the proﬁle could be different. The
assumption made by the Volatility tool is that these
changes are not signiﬁcant and therefore, a proﬁle gener-
ated from a single version of a major release will work on
all versions from that release.
We wanted to validate this assumption. We collected
the Windows kernel binary (ntkrnlmp.exe, ntkrpamp.exe,
ntoskrnl.exe) from several thousand machines in the wild
using the GRR tool (Cohen et al., 2011). Each of these bi-
naries has a unique GUID, and we were therefore able to
download the corresponding PDB ﬁle from the public
Microsoft symbol server. We then used Rekall's mspdb
parser to extract debugging information from each PDB ﬁle.
This resulted in 168 different binaries of the Windows
kernel for various versions (e.g. Windows XP, Windows
Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 8) and architectures (e.g.
I386 and AMD64). Clearly, there are many more versions of
the Windows kernel in the wild than exist in the Volatility
tool. It is also very likely that we have not collected all the
versions that were ever released by Microsoft, so our
sample size, although large, is not exhaustive.
Fig. 1 shows sampled offsets of four critical struct
members for memory analysis:
 The _EPROCESS.VadRoot is the location of the Vad within
the process. This is used to enumerate process alloca-
tions (Dolan-Gavitt, 2007b).
 The _KPROCESS.DirectoryTableBase is the location of the
Directory Table Base (i.e. the value loaded into the CR3
Fig. 1. Offsets for a few critical struct members across various versions of the Windows kernel. These offsets were derived by analyzing public debug information
from the Microsoft debug server for the binaries in our collection.
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Address Space abstraction.
 The _EPROCESS.ImageFileName is the ﬁle name of the
running binary. For example, this ﬁeld might contain
“csrss.exe”.
Microsoft Windows kernel versions contain four parts:
The major and minor versions, the revision and the build
number. The build number increases for each build (e.g.
security hotﬁx).
As can be seen in the ﬁgure, struct offsets do tend to
remain stable acrossWindows versions. In most cases, with
a single notable exception e version 5.2.3970.175 (GUID466B4165EAA84AF88D29D617E86A95982), the struct off-
sets remain the same for all major Windows releases.
Therefore, chances are good that the Volatility proﬁle for a
given Windows version would actually work most of the
time for determining struct layout.
Kernel global constants variability
It is generally not sufﬁcient to determine only the struct
memory layout for memory analysis. For example, consider
listing the running processes. One technique is to follow
the doubly linked list of EPROCESS.ActiveProcessLinks in
each process struct (Okolica and Peterson, 2010). This
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the global kernel constant PsActiveProcessHead. The loca-
tion for this global constant in memory is determined
statically by the compiler at compile time, and it is usually
stored in one of the data sections in the PE ﬁle itself.
Since this information is also required by the debugger,
the PDB ﬁle also contains information about global con-
stants and functions (even if these are not actually exported
via the Export Address Table). Rekall's mspdb plugin also
extract this information into the proﬁle.
Fig. 2 illustrates the memory addresses of some impor-
tant kernel constants for the kernels in our collection:Fig. 2. Offsets for a few global kernel constants across various versions of the Windo
from the Microsoft debug server for the binaries in our collection. Offsets are prov NtBuildLab is the location of the NT version string (e.g.
“7600.win7_rtm.090713-1255”). This is used to identify
the running kernel.
 PsActiveProcessHead is the head of the active process list.
This is required in order to list the running processes.
 NtCreateToken is an example of a kernel function. This
will normally exist in the .text section of the PE ﬁle.
 str:FILE_VERSION is literally the string “FILE_VERSION”.
Usually the compiler will place all literal strings into
their own string table in the .rdata section of the PE ﬁle.
The compiler will then emit debugging symbols for the
location of each string e indicating that they are literalws kernel. These offsets were derived by analyzing public debug information
ided relative to the kernel image base address.
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in the following sections.
As can be seen, the offsets of global kernel constants
change dramatically between each build e even for the
same version. This makes sense, since the compiler ar-
ranges global constants in their own PE section, so if any
global constant is added or removed in the entire kernel,
this affects the ordering of all other constants placed after
it.
It is therefore clear that it is unreliable to directly obtain
the addresses of kernel globals by simply relying on the
version alone. The Volatility tool resorts to a number of
techniques to obtain these globals:
 Many globals are obtained from the KdDebuggerData-
Block e another global kernel struct which contains
pointers to many other globals. This structure is usually
scanned for.
 Scanning for kernel objects which refer to global con-
stants (e.g. via pool tag scanning or other signatures).
 Examining the export tables of various PE binaries for
exported functions.
 Dynamically disassembling code to detect calls to non
exported functions.
These techniques are complex and error prone. They are
also susceptible to anti-forensics as signature scanners can
trivially be fooled by spurious signatures (Williams and
Torres, 2014). Scanning for signatures over very large
memory images is also slow and inefﬁcient.
The Rekall memory forensic framework (The Rekall
Team, 2014a, b), a fork of the Volatility framework, takes
a different approach. Instead of guessing the location of
various kernel constants, the framework relies on a public
proﬁle repository which contains every known proﬁle from
every known build of the Windows kernel. This greatly
simpliﬁes memory analysis algorithms because the address
of global kernel variables and functions is directly known
from public debugging information provided by Microsoft.
There is no need to scan or guess at all. Locating these
globals is very efﬁcient since there is no need to scan for
signatures, making the framework fast and reducing the
ability of attackers to subvert analysis.Identifying binary versions
The Rekall proﬁle repository contains, at the time of
writing, 309 proﬁles for various Windows kernel versions
(and this number is constantly increasing). Typically, users
will simply report the GUID of the Windows kernel found
in their image, but will not provide the actual kernel binary.
Previously, Rekall employed a scanning technique to
locate the GUID of the NT kernel running within the image.
Once the GUID is known, the correct proﬁle can be fetched
from the repository and analysis can begin. However, this
technique is still susceptible to manipulation (It is easy for
attackers to simply wipe or alter the GUID from memory).
Sometimes the GUID is paged out of memory and in this
case it is impossible to guess it. What we really need is areliable way to identify the kernel version without relying
on a single signature.
The problem of identifying kernel binaries in a memory
image has been examined previously in the Linux memory
analysis context (Roussev et al., 2014). In that paper, the
authors used similarity hashing to match the kernel in a
memory image with a corpus of known binaries.
In our case, we do not always have the actual binaries
but have debugging symbols from these binaries. We
therefore need a way for deducing enough information
about the kernel binary itself (which we may not have)
from the debug symbols. Consider the following informa-
tion present in the PDB ﬁle:
 String Literals. As shown in the example above, the
compiler generates string literals in the PE binary itself.
These are then located using global debugging symbols.
Forexample, inFig. 2weknowtheexactoffsets inmemory
where we expect ﬁnd the string “FILE_VERSION”.
 Function preamble. The PDB ﬁle also contains the loca-
tions of many functions. We note that each function is
generally preceded by 5 NOP instructions in order to
make room for hot patching (Chen, 2011). Thus, we can
deduce that for each function in the PDB, the previous
byte contains the value 090 (NOP instruction).
The problem, therefore, boils down to identifying which
of a ﬁnite set of kernel proﬁles is the one present in the
memory image, based on known data that must exist at
known offsets:
1. Begin by selecting a number of function names, or literal
string names. We term these Comparison Points since we
only compare the binaries at these known offsets.
2. Examine all available proﬁles, and record the offset of
these symbols as well as the expected data to appear at
this offset (either a NOP instruction or the literal string
itself).
3. Build a decision tree around the known comparison
points to minimize the number of string comparisons
required for narrowing down thematch. Note that at this
stage it is possible to determine if there are sufﬁcient
number of comparison points to distinguish all proﬁle
selections. If proﬁle selection is ambiguous, further
comparisonpoints are addedand theprocess starts again.
4. Scan the memory image for the longest strings using the
Aho-Corasick string matching algorithm (Aho and
Corasick, 1975).
5. For each match, seek around the match to apply the
decision tree calculated earlier. Within a few string
comparisons, the correct proﬁle is identiﬁed.
6. Load the proﬁle from the proﬁle repository and initialize
the analysis.
In practice it was found that fewer than a dozen com-
parison points are required to characterize all the proﬁles in
the Rekall proﬁle repository, leading to extremely quick
matching times. Also, binary identiﬁcation is robust to
manipulation since the choice of comparison points is
rather arbitrary and can be changed easily.
M.I. Cohen / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S38eS49 S43Windows kernel binary identiﬁcation
Section 3 described an efﬁcient algorithm for identi-
fying a binary match from a set of known binaries. How-
ever, in the memory analysis context, this comparisonmust
be made in the Virtual address space. Modern CPUs operate
in protected mode, and the exact memory accessible to the
kernel does not necessarily need to be contiguous in the
physical memory image.
Therefore, before we are able to apply the index classi-
ﬁcation algorithm, we must build a virtual address space,
requiring us to identify the value of CR3, or the kernel's
Directory Table Base (DTB).
The DTB can be captured during the acquisition process
and stored in the image, but typically it must be scanned for.
The Volatility memory forensic framework scans for the Idle
process's EPROCESS struct. Itﬁrst searches for the literal string
“Idle”, this should exist as the EPROCESS.ImageFileName
member. Knowing the difference between the offsets of
EPROCESS.ImageFileName and EPROCESS.Pcb.DirectoryTa-
bleBase, the framework reads the DTB and therefore locates
the page tables.
Theproblemwith thisapproach is that it requiresknowing
the exact offsets of two EPROCESS struct members. Fig. 1
shows how these relative offsets vary between Windows
versions, so to know the offset we need to know the exact
Windowsversionweare examininge butwecannot identify
the proﬁlewithout applying the proﬁle index,which requires
a valid kernel address space e i.e. knowing the DTB ﬁrst!
We solve this Catch-22 by noting that the total number
of combinations of the EPROCESSmember offsets is limited
(4 combinations for 64 bit architectures and 6 combina-
tions for 32 bit architectures). Therefore, it is possible to
brute force all combinations in search of a valid DTB.
So in summary the complete Kernel Binary Autode-
tection algorithm, as implemented in Rekall, is:
 Scan the image for commonWindows executable names
(e.g. “csrss.exe”, “cmd.exe” etc). This scan uses the Aho-
Corasick algorithm to search for all strings at once.
 For each hit, brute force the DTB going through the 10
possible offsets. The DTB is validated using the
KUSER_SHARED_DATA.NtMajorVersion and KUSER_-
SHARED_DATA.NtMinorVersion members. Since this
struct must be found at a ﬁxed location in memory and
always have the same layout it is safe to hardcode it
(Skape, 2005). Therefore, we can validate the DTB and
kernel address space without knowing anything about
the proﬁle itself or the kernel version.
 Once a DTB is identiﬁed, we construct a virtual address
space and scan for the kernel image in memory using
the algorithm previously described.Undocumented kernel structures
Section 2 examined the variability of documented
kernel structures across different kernel versions. The
question we try to answer now is, what is the variability of
undocumented kernel structures of signiﬁcance to the
memory analyst?One of the most interesting kernel drivers is the Win-
dows 32 user mode GUI subsystem (Mandt, 2011; Yuan,
2001), implemented as “win32k.sys”. The data structures
used in this subsystem are required to detect many com-
mon hooks placed by malware (e.g. SetWindowsHookEx()
style keyloggers (Sikorski and Honig, 2012)).
The Rekall proﬁle repository currently contains proﬁles
for 169 unique versions of this driver. However, only 33
versions include information about critical structures (e.g.
tagDESKTOP and tagWINDOWSTATION). The remaining
proﬁles only contain information about global constants
and functions, but no structure information.
Our goal is to understand how various important
structures evolved through the released versions. Since
many of these versions are undocumented and do not have
debugging information, previous research has manually
reverse engineered several samples from different ver-
sions. However, we are unsure if there is internal variability
within Windows versions and releases. Guided by our
previous experiencewith theWindows Kernel versions, we
hypothesize that the win32k.sys struct layout would not
vary much between minor release versions.
Given our large corpus of binaries we can directly
examine this hypothesis and evaluate the best approach for
determining struct layout when analyzing the Win32k GUI
subsystem.
Data driven reverse engineering
The literature contains a number of published systems
for automatically detecting kernel objects from memory
images (Sun et al., 2012). For example, the SigGraph system
(Lin et al., 2011), is capable of building scanners for Linux
kernel structures by analyzing their internal pointer
graphs.
The SigGraph system speciﬁcally does not utilize inci-
dental knowledge about the system to assist in the
reversing task. However on Windows systems, there are
some helpful observation one can make to facilitate type
analysis from memory dumps.
In the Windows kernel all allocations come from one of
the kernel pools (e.g. Paged, Non-Paged or Session Pool).
Allocations smaller than a page are preceded by a POOL_-
HEADER object (Schuster, 2006, 2008).
The pool header contains a known tag as well as in-
dications of the previous and next pool allocation (within
the page). Thus, small pool allocations form a doubly linked
list. Due to this property it is possible to validate the pool
header and locate it in memory. A typical Windows kernel
allocation is illustrated in Fig. 3.
If we were to ask, “What kernel object exists at a given
virtual offset?”, we can simply scan backwards for a suit-
able POOL_HEADER structure and deduce the type of object
from the pool tag. We can further scan forward from this
location for other heuristics, such as pointers to certain
other pool allocations, or doubly linked lists. We wrote a
Rekall plugin called analyze_structs to perform this analysis
on arbitrary memory locations.
For example, Fig. 4 shows the analysis of the global
symbol grpWinStaListwhich is the global offset of the head
of the tagWINDOWSTATION list. We can see that at offset
Fig. 3. An example of a typical Windows Kernel pool allocation. The
POOL_HEADER indicates the type of the allocation. This header is also part of
a doubly linked list with the next/previous allocation e a relationwhich may
be used to validate it. By observing the type of allocations the struct
members are pointing to it is possible to deduce the pointers and their
target type.
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018 there is a pointer to the global gTermIO object etc.
With Windows 7 we can ﬁnd the complete struct in-
formation in the PDB ﬁle. This is also shown in Fig. 4. We
can see that the detected pointers correspond with the
rpdeskList, pTerm, spklList, pGlobalAtomTable and psidUser
members.
An obvious limitation of this technique is that if a
pointer in the struct is set to NULL, we are unable to say
anything about it. Hence to reveal as many ﬁelds as
possible we need to examine as many instances of the
same object type as we can ﬁnd (e.g. via pool scanning
techniques).Fig. 4. Rekall analysis of the global symbol grpWinStaList which contains an allocati
extracted from the PDB ﬁle.Code based reverse engineering
The previous section demonstrates how we can deduce
some struct layouts by observation of allocationswe canﬁnd
from the kernel pools. However, these observations are not
sufﬁcient to deduce all types of members. Speciﬁcally, only
pointers are reliably deduced by this method. Additionally,
wemust observe allocatedmemory in amemorydump from
a running system. Oftenwe only have the executable binary
(e.g. from disk) but not the full memory image.
In these cases, we need to resort to the more traditional
reverse engineering approach. Previously, researchers have
reverse engineered speciﬁc exemplars of the win32k.sys
binary which is representative of a speciﬁc Windows
version (The Volatility Foundation, 2014). However,
manually reverse engineering every ﬁle in our large corpus
of win32k.sys binaries is time consuming and error prone.
Some forensic tools simply contain the reversed proﬁle
data as “Magic Numbers” embedded within their code (The
Volatility Foundation, 2014) without an explanation of
where these numbers came from, making forensic valida-
tion and cross checking difﬁcult.
We wish to automatically extend this analysis to new
binaries with minimal effort. We therefore want to express
the required assembler pattern as a template which can be
applied to the new ﬁle's disassembly. In practice, however,
the compiler is free to mix use of registers in functions, or
reorder branches. Often identical source code will generate
assembler code using different registers, and different
branching order.
Fig. 5 shows the same code segment from two different
versions of the xxxCreateWindowStation function. As can be
seen, although the general sequence of instructions is
similar, the exact registers are different for each case (Thison of type tagWINDOWSTATION. This is followed by the exact struct layout as
Fig. 5. Disassembled code for ﬁnding the tagTHREADINFO.rpdesk member offset. Even though the code is identical, different versions use different registers. We
deﬁne a search template (Below) in YAML format to describe the required pattern regardless of the exact registers used.
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variable gptiCurrent, a global tagTHREADINFO struct). We
therefore construct our pattern match in such a way that
exact register names are not speciﬁed. We only require the
same register to be used for $var1 throughout the pattern.
Additionally, the compiler may reorder Assembler code
fragments from version to version. When a branch is
reordered, the pattern match may be split into different
parts of the branching instruction. In order to normalize the
effect of branching, we unroll all branches in the assembly
output. This means we follow all branches until we reach
code that is already disassembled and then backtrack to
resume disassembly from the branch onwards. This tech-
nique allows us to match our pattern against the complete
code of each function.
For example consider Fig. 6. This shows a very short
function win32k!SetGlobalCursorLevel which dereferences
many pointers to a number of structs. The function iterates
over all desktops (tagDESKTOP) and all threads (tag-
THREADINFO) and sets their cursor level. It is quite simple
to infer the structs and ﬁelds involved when reading the
assembly code (for Windows 7) in conjunction with the
struct deﬁnitions exported in the PDB ﬁles for Windows 7.
The same templates can then be applied for other versions
of the binary for which there are no exported symbols.
Our template can now be published and independently
cross validated for accuracy. For example, in the event that
investigators ﬁnd a different version of the binary in the
wild, they are able to apply the templates and re-derive the
struct offsets directly from the binarye cross validating the
resulting proﬁle.
It must be noted that this technique does not work in
every case since the code does change from version to
version, sometimes dramatically. We therefore offer a
number of possible templates (to different functions) that
can be applied in turn until a match is found.Results
We have collected 133 unique versions of the
“win32k.sys” driver binary, and downloaded PDB ﬁles forthese samples. We then generated assembler templates for
many struct ﬁelds and ran these templates over these bi-
naries in our collections.
Fig. 7 shows a summary of struct offsets across different
versions of the win32k driver. As can be seen, the struct
offsets are generally not changed betweenmajor andminor
binary versions, although they do vary between eachminor
version.
Similarly, Fig. 8 shows that global constants vary wildly
from build to build, hence version number alone is insuf-
ﬁcient to provide reliable offsets for these constants.Discussion
This study's main goal was to characterize what factors
change between various binary versions, and how these are
relevant to memory analysis. We found that generally,
struct layout does not change within the same minor
version, but global constants were found to vary wildly
with version.
In our quest to characterize the variation we have
developed a number of very useful techniques:
1. We have developed a technique to build a “proﬁle index”
e a mechanism to quickly detect which proﬁle from a
pre-calculated proﬁle repository is applicable for a spe-
ciﬁc memory image. Our method is resilient to anti-
forensic manipulation since it uses a random selection
of comparison points chosen from the binary code and
data segments themselves.
2. We have also demonstrated a data analysis technique for
rapidly determining struct offsets by analyzing kernel
pool allocations.
3. We have created an Assembler templating language
which can be used to match sequences of assembler
code in order to extract struct offsets for struct members.
This technique can be applied for static binaries as well
as binaries found in memory images.
How should these techniques be applied in order to
improve the accuracy of memory analysis software?
Fig. 6. An example of matching an assembler pattern across a short function. First the function is unrolled such that all its branches are displayed. The pattern is
then applied such that the same registers are used in a consistent manner. By comparing the assembly code to the struct ﬁeld offsets in the exported PDB we can
easily infer the types of structs used in this function. We can then extrapolate this inference to deduce struct offsets for binary versions we have no debugging
information for.
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currently use techniques such as pool scanning, disassem-
bling and other heuristics to guess the locations of global
kernel variables (The Volatility Foundation, 2014). This is
especially problematic when trying to locate win32k.sys
global parameters since the GUI subsystem has a different
pool area for each session. Without contextual information,
pool scanning techniques can not associate the correct
kernel structures to the correct session, leading to many
erroneous results.
It is therefore desirable to rely on accurate proﬁle in-
formation in locating global structures. This warrants the
creation and maintenance of a public proﬁle repository
with accurate symbol information for each version
observed in the wild (The Rekall Team, 2014a, b). The
problem remains however, how does one know which
proﬁle should be used for a speciﬁc memory image?
By applying the proﬁle indexing technique, one can
reliably detect the correct proﬁle to use for each memoryimage. The proﬁles can then contain exact offsets of global
variables and functions. This improves analysis because
there is a large amount of accurate information available
(for example it is possible to resolve addresses to function
names e really helping with disassembly views).
Finally, we can address the problem of undocumented
struct layouts. While the win32k.sys proﬁles do contain the
addresses of global variables and functions, most do not
contain struct layout.
Although we can apply the assembler templates to
deduce the struct layouts directly within the memory
image, this is not a reliable technique since in practice,
many code pages will not be mapped into memory e
causing the disassembly of the required functions to fail.
Instead we can collect win32k.sys binaries of all major
andminor versions and apply the disassembly templates to
the binaries themselves. Although we can never be abso-
lutely sure that struct layouts are the same in all builds of
the same version, our analysis suggests this is the case. That
Fig. 7. Offsets for a selection of struct members across various versions of the Windows GUI subsystem. These offsets were derived by applying the automated
disassembly templates on the driver executable.
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major and minor version numbers of the win32k.sys binary
itself. We therefore make the assumption that struct layout
does not vary between major and minor versions (this
assumption seems to hold well as a result of this research).
Therefore, we construct a proﬁle for all win32k.sys bi-
naries bymerging the global constants and functions found
in the PDB ﬁles provided by Microsoft with the canonical
struct layout for the speciﬁc major and minor version. We
then similarly create a “proﬁle index” for all known
win32k.sys proﬁles and apply it on in the memory image to
detect the correct proﬁle to use.
Once the correct proﬁle is found (containing both ac-
curate constants and accurate struct layouts) we can use itto conduct analysis of the memory image without
problems.
Limitations of symbol based memory analysis
In this paper we ﬁnd that kernel constants vary greatly
between kernel builds. We advocate locating the kernel
constants directly from the debugging symbols distributed
by Microsoft. While this approach makes for an efﬁcient
analysis, which is less susceptible to manipulation, it does
have some shortcomings.
Themain problem is that we require the PDB ﬁles for the
exact versions of the kernel we are dealing with to be
available. While Microsoft typically publishes PDB ﬁles for
Fig. 8. Offsets for a selection of global constants across various versions of the Windows GUI subsystem. These offsets were derived by parsing the provided PDB
ﬁles for these binary versions.
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possible that PDB ﬁles for private, or development versions
of the operating system are not published.
When Rekall encounters a windows kernel version
which does not exist in the repository, the user may
follow a procedure to add it to the repository by down-
loading the corresponding debug information from the
Microsoft symbol server. However, if this is not possible
(perhaps because the PDB ﬁle is not published), the user
is unable to proceed at all. Rekall does not employ
scanning or guessing techniques for locating kernel
global constants without having the proﬁle information
(e.g. like Volatility does).Conclusions and future work
Although this paper concentrates speciﬁcally on the
Windows kernel binary and the win32k.sys GUI subsystem
driver, the techniques presented are applicable for other
drivers and binaries.
Speciﬁcally, the tcpip.sys driver manages the network
stack and is largely undocumented. The same techniques
we develop for constructing proﬁles from a mixture of
documented and undocumented (reversed) information
can be applied to this case.
Identifying which of a set of known binaries matches
the exact running binary in a memory image is a critical
M.I. Cohen / Digital Investigation 12 (2015) S38eS49 S49ﬁrst step to memory analysis of all operating systems. For
example, we have extended this method to auto-detect the
exact kernel running on an OSX system.
The ability to generate proﬁles with more accurate in-
formation allows one to abandon using scanning and
guessing techniques for determining this information from
the potentially compromised memory image itself. The less
the framework relies on the memory image to derive
analysis information, the more resilient it is to malicious
manipulation. For example, the literature has noted that
the Kernel Debugger Block can be easily overwritten by
malware in such away that memory analysis can fail to ﬁnd
it (Haruyama and Suzuki, 2012).
Finally, this paper presents the groundwork for ulti-
mately addressing the difﬁcult problem of Linux memory
analysis. Linux kernel struct layouts vary wildly based on
kernel conﬁguration as well as purely on kernel version.
Only recently has it become possible to acquire memory on
a Linux system in a kernel version agnostic manner
(Stüttgen and Cohen, 2014), but there is a wide need to
reliably determine the correct proﬁle for unknown kernels
e often encountered during incident response situations.
Previously, systems were proposed that attempted to
derive all kernel struct offsets by examining the speciﬁc
assembly instructions. However these systems, failed to
take into account register swapping and function re-
branching (Case et al., 2010), making them less reliable
for matching real kernels in practice. This paper's proposed
assembler templates are much more robust to these vari-
ations. Previous dynamic analysis platforms attempt to
build a complete proﬁle from the reversed parameters.
However, as shown in this paper, we only need to gather
just enough information to select the correct proﬁle from a
ﬁnite set of knownproﬁle variations. Futurework can apply
the techniques discussed in this paper to auto-detecting a
Linux proﬁle from an unknown kernel.
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